The following reference are the endnotes to the first chapter of Vitaly Naumkin’s *Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).

**CHAPTER ONE**

**The Roots and Causes of Islamic Radicalism: The History of Islam in Central Asia**

**Notes**

1. The term “Islamic fundamentalism” did not exist in Arabic, and was introduced into the language only in light of the need to translate a concept that appeared in English. For this purpose, the word *usuliyyah* (from *usul*, “fundamentals”) began to be used in Arabic.

1. The expansion became especially wide after the shocking rise of oil prices in 1973, when the Saudis could afford to spend billions of dollars outside the kingdom. The successful mobilization of jihad, supported by the United States, against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as a recent survey of Islam by the *Economist* asserts, made the Islamic internationalists believe that they could destroy a superpower, and “Muslim identification with the entire *umma*” became much stronger (“In the name of God,” *Economist*, September 13, 2003, 12).


1. The founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud, said on May 11, 1929: “They call us the ‘Wahhabis’ and they call our creed a ‘Wahhabi’ one, as if it were a special one, . . . and this is an extremely erroneous allegation that has arisen from the false propaganda launched by those who had ill feelings as well as ill intentions towards the movement. We are not proclaiming a new creed or a new dogma. Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab did not come with anything new. Our creed is the creed of those good people who preceded us and which came in the Book of God (the Qur’an) as well as that of his Messenger (the prophet Muhammad, prayer and peace be upon him).” Fouad Al-
1. Mansour al-Noqaidan, “Telling the Truth, Facing the Whip,” International Herald Tribune, November 29–30, 2003, 8. Noqaidan is a remarkable public figure in Saudi Arabia. A journalist in his thirties, he is a former “neo-Salafi,” as he refers to himself as of the jihadist brand of Salafis, who later turned into a bitter critic of the Wahhabi dogma, including the concept of takfir, which he considers responsible for the act of violence.


1. For instance, the Crimean Tatar Jadid enlightener Ismail Bey Gasprali, or Gasprinsky (1851–1914), called for relinquishing the outdated, stale manner of teaching in maktabs (Islamic schools) by mullas, deeming it necessary to study Russian so as to “educate our children and let them rise in the world” (Terjuman [Backchisarai, Russia], January 31, 1913).


1. Ishan is an honorific title applied throughout Central Asia to spiritual leaders. In most cases, the title is inherited, but on occasion it can be acquired as a result of piety and religious knowledge. Ishans are usually members of the families of shaykhs or leaders of certain Sufi brotherhoods or branches, although some of them do not have direct ties to the brotherhoods or branches.

1. Islam in Central Asia had been rather closely connected with Volga Islam, and so it is interesting to compare the structure of the religious class in these two regions. On the evidence of Russian researchers, fuqaha’ and ‘ulama, not to mention imams and
mu’azzins, appeared in Volga Bulgaria after the adoption of Islam as early as the tenth century. After the Mongol conquest in the thirteenth century, the role of Sufism, as in Central Asia, began to grow (see M. K. Garipov, Politika Rossiiskogo gosudarstva v etnokonfessional’noi sfere v kontse XVIII–nachale XX vv.: opyt Dukhovnogo upravleniya musul’man [The policy of the Russian state in the ethnoconfessional sphere in the late eighteenth–early twentieth centuries] PhD dissertation, Kazan State University, 2003), in particular that of Naqshbandiyya, Qubraviyya, and Yasaviyya. The shaykhs of the Sufi orders began to occupy the foremost place in the religious elite, and qadis and Muftis appeared. Along with them, this elite included sayyids—descendants of the Prophet Muhammad.

1. The quality of religious education at the official institutions such as Mir-i Arab madrasa in Bukhara has been always attested as low, although it has improved in the 1990s. One of the religious authorities of Namangan, ‘Umar Khan domulla, said to a group of Uzbek scholars that after the graduation from hujra he spent about a year as a worker at the Mir-i Arab madrasa in Bukhara planning to enroll in it, but was surprised when he found out that he knew more than its graduates. Ishaq qari of Kokand told me that the level of a student who had studied in his hujra one and one-half years was equal to the level of a Mir-i Arab graduate (interview in Kokand on January 10, 2004).
According to Alec Rasizade, the collapse of social services, poor public health care, poor public education, massive unemployment, and crippling poverty all “offer militant Islamic groups ripe ground for recruitment” (Alec Rasizade, “The New ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia after Afghanistan,” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 1, no. 2, Summer 2002, 54). This author believes this direct linkage between poverty and Islamic radicalism is proved by the absence of Islamic radicalism in such oppressive places as Turkmenistan, where the government provides free gas, free electricity, free water, free heating and other utilities, almost free apartments, and free public transportation. But one would hardly support the suggestion that the population of Turkmenistan enjoys high living standards. An average Turkmen family finds it none the easier to make ends meet than, for example, an Uzbek family, which has no such benefits.


Esposito, Unholy War, 157.

Bernard Lewis, Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 153–54. It is not quite clear whether Lewis is addressing suicide bombers
here and telling them that they have misunderstood Islam or is addressing Westerners
who consider Islam responsible for suicide attacks.

1. Simon Haddad and Hilal Khashan, “Islam and Terrorism, Lebanese Muslim Views on

1. F. Burgat examined the paths of three remarkable characters to Islamism. Famous
Egyptian intellectual ‘Adil Husayn was imprisoned for about eleven years as a
Communist militant, then switched from Marxism to Nasserism and finally to Islamism
to become secretary of the Egyptian Labor Party. Another Egyptian thinker and writer,
Tariq al-Bishri, underwent a similar transformation, departing from Arab nationalism for
Islamism when he understood that “nothing protects the Arabism of an Egyptian better
than Islam.” One of the most prominent leaders of modern political Islam in the Middle
East, Rashid Ghannushi from Tunisia, in his own words on the night of June 15, 1966,
“took a final decision to pass from the world of Arab nationalism and Nasserism to
Islam” (Burgat, *Face to Face*, 24–42). The list of such ideological converts is not
exhausted by these personalities. I know a lot of people of the same ilk in Egypt, Yemen,
Palestine, and some other states.


1. Randall Galvert, “Identity, Expression and Rational-Choice Theory,” in *Political
Science: The State of the Discipline*, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner


1. Expert: US Failure to Comprehend Islamic Radical Motivations Undermines
Democratization Hopes for Middle East, Central Asia, *EurasiaNet: Eurasia Insight*, May

(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), and *Peoples Versus
States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 2000). Charles Tilly has criticized Gurr for failing to distinguish between
violence inflicted by governmental agents and their allies on the one hand and violence

1. The Tajik conflict, in my view, was not directly related to Islam. Indeed, most analysts of the Tajik conflict take a functionalist approach toward the role of Islam in the conflict, arguing that Islam was only an instrument of political mobilization. Others deny that Islam had any role whatsoever. Olivier Roy, for example, has argued that the basis for political mobilization in Tajikistan has always been regional, not ideological or religious (as stated in several public presentations). However, it is more appropriate to argue that it was a conflict between regional elites competing over redistribution of wealth and power than to argue that it was a conflict between regions per se, given the traditional political passivity of the majority of the population and the lack of direct interest on its part in the competition. Moreover, the Islamic factor cannot be ignored. Islam was used instrumentally for political mobilization and as a genuine system of values and concepts around which some groups of the population rallied. In addition, Roy argues that Islamic identity is constructed purely for the sake of political goals of a primarily nationalist nature, which I also disagree with.

1. The same Islamic groups were involved in similar violent clashes with government forces in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan at the end of 1990s. These events are described in the next chapter of this book.


1. The clash of civilizations thesis can also be viewed as a *culturalist* argument. However, a deep feeling of insecurity is the overwhelming factor that is adduced to explain the supposed clash of civilizations, and therefore I prefer to categorize it as security oriented.


1. Quintan Wiktorowicz, for example, observed that some scholars turned to social movement theory to escape the narrowness of such an approach (see Quintan
Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajirun and Radical Islam,” a paper presented to the conference “The Roots of Islamic Radicalism,” Yale University, May 8–9, 2004, at www.yale.edu/polisci/info/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/). In a case study of this radical Islamic group, based in Britain, Wiktorowicz accepted a grievance-based explanation, but only as a cognitive opening, which is necessarily followed by religious seeking and frame alignment, which “all affect the prospect of successful socialization.” Socialization, in its turn, “is needed to indoctrinate individuals into the movement ideology” (23). This author focused on the process of persuasion, thus adding an important perspective to the general debate on Islamic radicalism. The scope of Al-Muhajirun is a bit narrow but still helpful. It is worth mentioning that the future recruits in Britain suffered from identity crisis; they were “trapped between two competing socialization environments: a) secular British society and institutions that proposed equity but in reality offered discrimination; and b) the traditional home with its passive religious values and narrow focus on the Muslim community and rituals” (14). It would have been extremely interesting to know whether all recruits for the al-Qa‘ida cause in the West also experienced discrimination as those *muhajirs* who were interviewed by Wiktorowicz. As in the case of leftist revolutionaries and Arab nationalists earlier, at least some of them might have been well established in the Western society.
